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Abstract: Sentences for employers convicted of offences under NZ health and safety law 
have been subject to constraints from two main sources (i) legislation; and (ii) guideline 
judgment cases.  Their effect is to effectively split sentencing into three distinct time periods, 
viz., the period following the introduction of the De Spa Guidelines to the implementation of 
the Sentencing Act 2002, the second following the joint implementation of the Sentencing 
Act and the Health and Safety in Employment Amendment Act to the Hanham & Philp 
Guideline judgment in December 2008, and the third is the post Hanham & Philp Guideline 
period.  This article builds on previous work that analyses the various factors relevant to HSE 
sentencing, concentrating on the second and third periods. We find a difference in sentencing
factors that matter at the single s 6 charge level versus the case level and also find that these 
factors differ across periods. In particular, although harm continues to play an important role 
in explaining sentences of reparation, its previous role in directly explaining levels of fines is 
replaced by various levels of employer culpability. The Hanham & Philp decisions 
incorporated harm in determining culpability and District Court judges appear to follow this 
judgment closely in this respect. 
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1 Introduction 
Sentences for employers convicted of offences under the Health and Safety in 
Employment (“HSE”) Act 1992 in New Zealand (“NZ”) have been subject to constraints 
from two main sources. The first are those imposed by the legislature, viz., the HSE Act and 
its amendments, and the Sentencing Act 2002. The second are the guideline judgments in two 
Full Bench High Court appeal cases; viz., De Spa1 and Hanham & Philp2, both of which 
involved successful appeals against sentences by the (then) NZ Department of Labour.3 In De 
Spa, the convicted employer’s fine was raised by 130 percent, and nine sentencing criteria to 
which frequent reference has been made in subsequent sentencing decisions were specified. 
The De Spa Guidelines were later codified with only minor changes in s 51(A) of the HSE 
Act following its amendment in 2002. Hanham & Philp involved appeals in three cases 
considered together, with fines substantially increased in all cases, in part a belated response 
to a five-fold increase in the maximum fines introduced in the HSE Amendment Act 2002. In 
addition, three ranges of substantial sentencing starting points for fines were established.
The De Spa Guidelines constituted a list of identified sentencing factors, including (1) 
the degree of culpability; (2) the degree of harm resulting; (3) the financial circumstances of 
the offender; (4) the attitude of the offender, including remorse, co-operation, and taking 
remedial action; (5) any guilty plea; (6) the need for deterrence, both particular and general; 
(7) compensation to the victim under s 28 Criminal Justice Act 1985; (8) the employer’s 
safety record; and (9) the facts of the particular case. 
In previous papers, Menclova and Woodfield (2011, 2013a) examined empirically the 
NZ District Courts’ sentencing criteria and the associated financial liability in terms of fines 
and reparation awards for employers convicted of offences under the HSE Act between 23 
March 1994 and 18 December 2008.4  Those papers focused on s 6 offences that were by far 
the most common, and also examined the aggregation of sentences to the case level in order
to be able to investigate all multiple-charge and/or multiple-victim situations. The data were 
also stratified into two time periods. The first (“period 1”) applied prior to the 
implementation of the Sentencing Act on 30 June 2002. The second (“period 2”) ran from 5 
May 2003 through 18 December 2008 and covered cases sentenced after the date from which 
both the Sentencing Act and HSE Act amendments jointly applied through to the decision 
date for Hanham & Philp.  
  
1 Department of Labour v De Spa and Co Ltd. [1994] 1 ERNZ 339.
2 Department of Labour v Hanham & Philp Contractors Limited & Ors [2008] 6 NZELR 79. 
3 Incorporated in the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment on 1 July, 2012.
4 The database for Menclova and Woodfield (2011) ended in June 2007.
3A number of statistically significant results appear in this work. For example, 
financial liability for employers increased with the degrees of culpability and harm, and with 
the need for particular deterrence. The most significant mitigating factors seemed to be the 
defendant’s financial limitations and small employer size. Other variables, such as a ‘guilty’ 
plea, cooperation, the employer’s safety record, or the need for general deterrence did not 
seem to play a significant role. For the case-level estimations, the number of charges was a 
significant predictor of financial liability imposed for the periods 1 and 2 combined, and for 
the earlier period considered separately. Regarding period 1 versus period 2 estimates, the 
most obvious pattern was that the (absolute) sizes of the significant coefficients were much 
larger in the more recent period indicating that the monetary penalties or discounts associated 
with various case characteristics increased substantially over time. Notably, the estimated 
models exhibited quite high explanatory power.
During period 2, the De Spa Guidelines largely continued to apply except that fines 
could no longer be awarded to victims. Instead, the Sentencing Act 2002 introduced a 
requirement for (uncapped) reparations to be routinely awarded where applicable and that 
reparation awards should be determined prior to setting other aspects of sentences such as 
fines.5 In Department of Labour v Ferrier Woolscours (Canterbury) Ltd [2005] DCR 356, 
Judge Abbott outlined a “two-step” approach to sentencing whereby the amount of reparation 
was fixed on a stand-alone basis and then any other aspect of sentence such as a fine would 
be determined, taking into consideration the need for the total penalty to be proportionate to 
the offending. Clark (2008) argued that DC judges initially applied the Sentencing Act and 
this two-step approach in a manner consistent with the Criminal Justice Act 1985. Section 28 
of CJA had permitted all or part of a fine to be awarded as compensation to victims at the 
discretion of the court, but this section was repealed following the introduction of the 
Sentencing Act. Under the CJA, Clark (p. 437) argued that “the court set what it considered 
to be an appropriate total penalty, and then divided the total penalty between reparation and 
fine,” the effect of which had led to a dollar-for-dollar discount in fines being given for 
reparation awards. Mason (2008) was critical of this procedure, and emphasized that the 
intent of reparations, unlike fines, is not penal in nature. It appeared that fines had become a 
residual, of limited quantitative importance in many major cases where employers were 
financially capable of meeting significant levels of liability, in some cases because they 
carried reparation insurance. 
The High Court judgment in Hanham & Philp changed the above situation 
dramatically. As appellant, the main submission of the (then) Department of Labour (“DoL”) 
was that the fines imposed at District Court (“DC”) level in the three appealed cases were 
manifestly inadequate and failed to reflect the five-fold increase in the maximum fine for s 50 
offences enacted in the amended HSE Act. Evidence showing that 90 percent of total 
financial liabilities since May 2003 had not exceeded $50,000 (just 20 percent of the
maximum fine alone) was accepted by the Court. It was also argued that it was timely to 
  
5 Note that it was not uncommon during period 2 to include accident compensation ‘top-ups’ in reparation 
awards. An early post Sentencing Act example is Department of Labour v University of Otago, DC Dunedin, 
CRN 3012510001, 24 November 2003. 
4review the sentencing principles embodied in De Spa. The Court was easily persuaded to 
conduct such a review, and the respondents offered no serious objections. According to 
Hughes (2009) in his case comment on Hanham & Philp, “For some five years, District 
Court Judges have been resisting invitations to substantially increase the level of fines in line 
with the 2002 amendment until structured guidance was available from the High Court.” 6
The Court emphasized the distinct statutory purposes of reparations and fines in line 
with DoL’s submissions, arguing that each required independent attention in the sentencing 
process. Compared to the previous two-step approach to sentencing, the Court preferred an 
approach involving a third step along with a more systematic and transparent approach to 
setting the level of fines. Further, in order to meet the prime object of the HSE Act, viz., the 
prevention of workplace harms, sentencing would generally require sufficient weight being 
given to the purposes of denunciation, deterrence, and accountability for harms done in terms 
of s 7 Sentencing Act.
In its discussion of sentencing methodology, the Court considered that the logical first 
step would continue to fix the amount of reparation taking into account any amends offered 
or made. If made, reparation orders should be discounted dollar-for-dollar by the amount of 
payments made, whereas if unpaid offers had been made, the amounts should be included in 
the reparation award or sentencing adjourned until payment was made. Further, where 
employers were impecunious, the level of reparation should reflect the limited capacity to 
make payments. Absent from this discussion, however, was any mention of the criteria that 
might be used to fix the quantum of reparation.
The second step would continue to fix the amount of the fine with the proviso that the 
approach in R v Taueki [2005] 3 NZLR 372 be followed, requiring a starting point to be 
adopted based on the circumstances of the offending and adjusted for the offender’s financial 
circumstances, any amends made, and relevant aggravating or mitigating factors considered. 
Prior to Hanham & Philp, starting points had not been mandatory.7 Notably, and in contrast 
with prior practice, the process of determining the amount of a fine should be carried out 
independently of any reparation order made. The Court, however, rejected an 18 category 
hierarchy of starting points proposed by DoL, opting instead for three broad categories based 
on the level of the offender’s culpability. The Court identified (at [54]) a set of criteria for 
assessing culpability (blameworthiness) and set starting points according to the following 
scale: for low culpability, a fine not exceeding $50,000; for medium culpability, a fine 
between $50,000 and $100,000; for high culpability, a fine between $100,000 and $175,000 
(although higher starting points might be required in cases of “extremely high” culpability).8
Finally, the Court included a third step, suggesting that judges should consider whether the 
  
6 Cf., Hughes Employment Law Bulletin (2009) 36, No. 2.
7 Starting points, however, were not uncommon in the period 5 May 2003 – 18 December 2008. For example, 
we identified starting points in 25 percent of successfully prosecuted s 6 offences during this period, and there 
may have been others that we could not identify due to lack of reporting, especially where judicial decisions or 
sentencing notes were unavailable.  
8 These three broad categories not only contrast sharply with the 18 categories recommended by DoL but even 
more sharply with the much finer approach adopted in 1987 in the United States’ criminal Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, involving a grid of 258 boxes in a sentencing table based only on a criminal’s past record and 
offence severity.  As a consequence, in HSE cases, NZ judges are still permitted considerable latitude for 
judicial sentencing variation.
5resulting total financial liability – composed of reparation and fine set at steps 1 and 2, 
respectively - is proportionate to the circumstances of the offending and the offender.
The Court clearly supported a substantial increase in the level of fines and explicitly 
rejected the seemingly common District Court practice of dollar-for-dollar discounting fines 
that would have been imposed in the absence of reparation awards except in the case where 
offenders had a demonstrably limited financial capacity.9 It was argued that an increase in the 
level of fines was necessary in order to reflect the five-fold increase in the maximum fine to 
account for inflation and the need for deterrence in light of the ongoing costs and the serious 
nature of workplace accidents. In general, s 8(c) and (d) Sentencing Act required penalties to 
be set at or close to the maximum for the most serious offending and District Court Judges 
had typically failed to come close to meeting this statutory requirement. The Court, however, 
continued to encourage the exercise of judicial discretion in that (at [60]) “Tailoring to the 
individual circumstances of the case remains essential, as is the need to avoid undue 
hardship.” This left the issue of precisely what “taking into account” the amount of reparation 
ordered (or amends made) meant when setting fines somewhat unclear. At [69], however, and 
without wishing to set a precise range, the Court suggested that “a discount of up to 10 to 15 
percent in the level of the fine is reasonable to recognize the order for reparation in the case 
of an offender of adequate means.” If such an offender was insured against reparation orders, 
the Court argued (at [74]) that “some modest allowance may be justified to recognise the 
employer’s responsible approach in securing insurance cover to provide for injured 
employees but we would see this as sufficiently allowed for in the discount of 10 to 15 
percent already discussed at [69].” 
Regarding the three cases appealed, the Court (at [81]) noted a reluctance to increase 
rather than reduce sentences and would only increase a sentence if it were convinced that it 
had been manifestly inadequate.  The sentence would also be increased by the minimum 
necessary to prevent it being continued to be so considered. In its conclusions (at [164]), the 
Court noted that while their approach should generate greater consistency of starting points 
for fines, endpoints could easily show considerable variation since final results may be 
affected by financial capacity and/or reparation amounts (and also variations in mitigating 
and aggravating factors for that matter). The decisions were as follows. 
Hanham & Philp Contractors Ltd. A fine of $5,000 was quashed and a fine of 
$50,000 (an increase by a factor) was substituted once a starting point of $125,000 was 
reduced by 55 percent reflecting a number of substantial mitigating factors. The DC
reparation order of $12,000 was unchallenged.
  
9 This discounting would presumably have had little impact on the fines that would otherwise have been set if 
reparation awards had been relatively small in magnitude. For example, among a sample of reported views 
appearing in Safeguard: Health & Safety News (2006), employment lawyer Tim Rainey was reported as 
claiming that reparation awards were far in excess of anything that could be justified except for physical harm 
(to which reparations do not apply) and that only nominal payments (not exceeding $2000-$3000) were intended 
by the legislation. No justification of this reasoning was given, however, and, unlike the amended HSE Act, 
reparation awards are uncapped. As it transpired, reparation awards were not trivial. Between 5 May 2003 and 
18 December 2008, reparation awards were made in 93 percent of successfully prosecuted cases and averaged 
$15,065 in amount.
6Cookie Time Ltd. A fine of $15,000 was quashed and substituted by a fine of $40,000 
(i.e., an increase of 167%), which together with the initial unchallenged reparation of $5,000 
was held to be not disproportionate. The amount of the reparation, however, was described 
(at [141]) as “barely adequate.” 
Black Reef Mine Ltd. The defendant’s liability for $30,000 reparation to the widow of 
a deceased worker was increased to $55,000 (i.e., nearly doubled), while the fine of $10,000 
was doubled to $20,000. The Court noted that the fine would have been substantially higher 
(at $70,000) had the company not faced difficult financial circumstances. 
The present article empirically examines the extent to which specified potential 
determinants of HSE sentencing apply to total financial liability and its division between
fines and reparation awards in periods 2 and 3, respectively. In particular, we consider 
whether the Hanham & Philp Guidelines induced substantial fine-increasing behavior by 
District Court judges in accordance with the new starting point ranges and the extent to which 
other important determinants of fines were thereby affected. The article is organised as 
follows. In section 2, we briefly summarize the general role of guideline judgments. Section 3 
discusses the database used in this study, while section 4 outlines the models used in
estimating the determinants of employer financial liability and its components and applies 
these models to the data for periods 2 and 3. Section 4 concludes with a summary of our 
estimation results that may be useful for readers less interested in the full details. Section 5
summarizes some issues that we believe are important for the design of future estimation 
work in this field, and a brief conclusion discussing possible policy uses for our estimation 
analysis is contained in Section 6. 
 
2 The Role of Guideline Judgments
While a major purpose of sentencing guidelines is the promotion of sentencing 
consistency for similar offending,10 it has been argued that little attempt is made in NZ 
guideline judgments to analyse, categorise, and weigh the various factors deemed to be 
relevant to sentencing.11 In this respect, the De Spa Guidelines were fairly typical in that they 
merely constituted a list of sentencing factors seen to be relevant. No direct indication was 
given as to whether these factors were listed in any particular order of importance, nor 
whether different weights should have been applied to the various criteria. Not even the signs 
of the effects of the various criteria on penalties were provided, although these may be 
implicit in general NZ sentencing principles.12
While guideline judgments typically establish sentencing ranges for particular 
offences, the judgment in De Spa did not do so (although an indication of what was 
  
10 Cf., Sentencing – Courts of New Zealand, http://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/about/system/role/sentencing.html, 
accessed 18_02_2009, and s 8 Sentencing Act 2002.
11 Cf., Hall (2009 at I.2.2(c)).
12 Cf., Hall (2009, section I).
7considered a likely appeal-proof upper bound for the penalty was provided).13 By contrast, 
Hanham & Philp gives clear primacy to the assessment and role of employer 
blameworthiness in determining starting points for fines within specific ranges that exhibit 
considerable bite. The Full Bench in De Spa denied that sentencing is a mathematical 
exercise and emphasized the importance of the circumstances of the individual case. Similar, 
if somewhat less emphatic sentiments are expressed (at [57]) in Hanham & Philp. Although a 
number of judges continue to support this view of sentencing for HSE offences, others, for 
example Judge Blackie in Department of Labour v George Grant Engineering Limited, DC 
Papakura, CRI-2009-055-003473, 28 April 2010, argues (at [27]) that “the starting point for 
the fine …. has become in recent times a mathematical exercise.” Further related 
“mathematical exercises” have been encouraged by the recent appeal judgments in Raymond 
Everest Hessell v R, SC 102/2009, [2010] NZSC 135 (relating to the rate of discount for an 
early plea of guilty and the separation of discounts for such a plea and for demonstrated 
remorse and assistance to the authorities) and in Ballard v Department of Labour [2010] 7 
NZELR 301 in respect of assessing detailed percentage discounts for the full range of 
mitigating factors. The evolution of HSE sentencing guidelines (along with the subsequent 
appeal decisions above) appears consistent with the view of the general development of 
sentencing guidelines as expressed in R v AM [2010] NZLR 750 (at [13]) in their “emphasis 
on structured sentencing.” In this article, we empirically test the extent to which DC judges 
conform with the De Spa Guidelines (as codified) and the Hanham & Philp Guidelines 
(together with relevant appeal judgments not constituting guidelines) when making decisions 
on levels of fines.
3 HSE Offence Data14
Our main dataset consists of coded charge-level information. The major source, 
provided by the (then) Department of Labour, contains a largely comprehensive list of 
successful prosecutions for HSE offences since inception of the HSE Act.15 This database 
includes, inter alia, the amounts of any fines imposed and reparations awarded, along with 
case decisions and sentencing notes where available. Cases by judge were also identified.16
The Department was also particularly helpful in tracking down and supplying copies of 
summaries of facts, judicial decisions, sentencing notes, and returns on prosecutions that 
were otherwise unavailable to us. In addition, the Safeguard CourtBase provided succinct 
summaries of each accident and returns on prosecutions for post-2002 cases (however, only 
since 2004/5 did the Returns on Prosecutions begin to include information on the sentencing 
factors). Returns on Prosecutions were very useful where no decision/sentencing note was 
available for a particular case.
  
13 Since De Spa was a relatively early case in terms of administration of the HSE Act, the High Court judges 
may have had few similar cases to which reference might have been made in order to establish sentencing 
ranges. Starting points in health and safety sentencing, however, were considered to be potentially misleading. 
In their view, the sole merit of a starting point was to indicate the magnitude of any discount for a plea of guilty. 
14 Our discussion in this section closely follows section 5 in Menclova and Woodfield (2011) which frequently 
elaborates many points to which the reader is referred for details. 
15 Department of Labour, HSE.xls (unpublished), Wellington.
16 Department of Labour, Cases by Judge.xls (unpublished), Wellington.
8As in Menclova and Woodfield (2011, 2013), we measure an employer’s total 
financial liability by the sum of all fines imposed and reparations awarded in each 
charge/case.17
Our master dataset (beginning in 1993) includes 2,438 charges. Out of those, we 
initially focus on s 6 offences that are by far the most common. Section 6 of the HSE Act 
states that “Every employer shall take all practicable steps to ensure the safety of employees 
while at work” and section 2A of the HSE Amendment Act qualifies “all practicable steps” as 
“all reasonably practicable steps.” As such, a s 6 offence is a relatively general offence 
(unlike most criminal offences in NZ). We examine s 6 offences in order to limit ourselves to 
a reasonably coherent set of charges for which similar sentencing criteria might be expected. 
We only examine charges for an injury, limit ourselves to DC cases, and study convictions 
without a discharge. The above restrictions leave us with 242 s 6 charge-level observations in 
period 2 and 123 in period 3 (the most recent sentencing date for which is 7 March 2012).
 
To examine how our model performs in multiple-charge and/or multiple-victim cases 
(including those without a s 6 offence), we also examine the aggregation of sentences to the 
case level. This analysis can address the concern that sentencing variability regarding s 6 
charges arises in part because judges may attach the whole sentence to a single (often s 6) 
charge. Our inclusion criteria in the case-level analysis are similar to the charge-level 
analysis. For each case, we aggregate all charges on which the defendant was convicted. The 
resulting case-level sample contains 318 observations for period 2 and 178 for period 3.
Table 1: Mean Levels of Fines, Reparations and Total Liability
S 6 charges Case level
Period 2 Period 3 Period 2 Period 3
Fines $13,312 $33,961 $12,756 $32,567
Reparations $13,283 $23,480 $14,786 $22,982
Total liability $26,595 $57,360 $28,742 $56,551
In Table 1, we illustrate some broad changes in sentencing policy post Hanham & 
Philp in terms of the mean levels of fines, reparations, and total financial liability between the 
two periods. In period 2, mean fines and reparations were similar in magnitude, particularly 
for s 6 charges. In period 3, however, although mean reparations increased by 77 percent for s 
  
17 We do not include court costs in our measure of total financial liability for two reasons. Although we have 
comprehensive data on fines and reparations, there are many cases with missing information on cost awards. 
Also, there is no indication in HSE sentencing guidelines that court costs should in a systematic manner depend 
on the characteristics of the case or the defendant.
96 charges and 55 percent at the case level, the corresponding increases for fines were 155 
percent in each sample. Total liability increased by 116 percent for s 6 offences and 97 
percent at the case level. The major driving force for the increases in total liability was 
clearly the expansion in the level of fines.
With respect to sentencing criteria, the data we code contains detailed information on 
the characteristics of each charge/case (such as the degrees of harm and culpability, employee 
breach of duty, and the presence of remedial action) and the defendant (such as the 
employer’s safety record, need for particular deterrence, and financial limitations and size).18
Using this information (where available), we create proxies for the case characteristics 
specified in the (codified) De Spa Guidelines and Hanham & Philp Guidelines that most 
closely resemble the categories typically used in case decisions and/or sentencing notes as 
follows, together with additional dummy variables that attempt to capture the effects of 
several recent appeal decisions relevant to HSE sentencing as follows. 
1. The degree of culpability: we assign each charge/case into one of the following six 
culpability categories: ‘low’, ‘low-medium’, ‘medium’, ‘medium-high’, ‘high’, and 
‘unknown’; 
2. The degree of harm resulting: we use four mutually-exclusive categories of harm: 
‘low or medium’, ‘high’, ‘fatal’, and ‘unknown’; 
3. The financial circumstances of the offender: we use a binary variable to indicate the 
presence of a defendant’s financial limitations;
4. The attitude of the offender: the presence of remorse, cooperation, and remedial 
action is indicated by three separate binary variables – one for each of the expressions of the 
offender’s attitude;
5. Any early guilty plea: indicated by a binary variable;
6. The need for deterrence: the need for deterrence is expressed by two binary variables 
indicating separately the ‘need for particular deterrence’ and the ‘need for general 
deterrence’;
7. The employer’s safety record: we use six categories of the defendant’s safety record: 
‘poor’, ‘previous convictions’, ‘no previous convictions’, ‘good’, ‘great’, and ‘unknown’;
8. The facts of the particular case: in our full models we include additional 
characteristics of each case. Namely, we create separate binary variables for the presence of a 
voluntary payment, employer attendance at a restorative justice conference, an employee 
breach of duty, and the presence of employer reparation insurance. We also express the size 
of the employer as: ‘small’, ‘medium’, ‘large’, or ‘unknown’.19 The number of physically 
harmed accident victims in each case is also included along with the number of ‘related 
defendants’, i.e., the number of co-defendants in a case plus any other defendants obliged to 
  
18 The detail of information available to us varies somewhat, being more detailed for judicial decisions and 
sentencing notes than for the summary information prepared in DoL’s Returns on Prosecutions.
19 As expected, smaller employers are more likely to be subject to financial limitations but the correlation is far 
from perfect. While only one of the employers identified as ‘large’ is recorded as having financial limitations, 
36 percent of ‘small’ and ‘medium’ employers have financial limitations recorded. Data on employer size, 
however, is limited.
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share in making reparation payments when there are multiple defendants. We also indicate in 
which year the offence took place in order to account for a national trend in HSE sentencing.
9. Post Street Smart case time period: indicated by a binary variable, and relates to an 
appeal allowed by the High Court in Department of Labour v Street Smart Ltd, 8 August 
2008, (2008) 5 NZELR 587 (BC200862161). In her judgment, Duffy J agreed with DoL that 
a dollar-for-dollar discount of fines for reparations awarded should not automatically be 
applied, and argued (at [40]) that it was “enough if a judge gives consideration to any 
reparation payment that has been made.” Further, the judge reasoned that the presence of 
reparation insurance would have the effect of reducing the financial impact of the reparation 
order on the offender, and, as a consequence, must also affect the size of the fine. This 
variable is applicable to period 2 only (since all period 3 sentencing decisions are subject to 
Street Smart).
10. ACC Top up time period: indicated by a binary variable, and which relates to a 
decision of the Supreme Court in Peter Miles Davies v New Zealand Police, 25 May 2009, 
SC 83/2007, [2009] NZSC 47 to disallow a loss of earnings consequential on physical harm 
(‘ACC top ups’) from being the subject of reparation under s 32(1) of the Sentencing Act. 
This variable is applicable to period 3 only.
11. Guilty plea discount: indicated by a binary variable that interacts the presence of an 
early guilty plea with a time dummy for a decision of the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in  R v 
Hessell, 2 October 2009, [2009] NZCA 450, and which also relates to an appeal dismissed by 
the Supreme Court (“SC”) in Raymond Everest Hessell v R, SC 102/2009 [2010] NZSC 135. 
Here, the decision in the CA was upheld but the SC considered that the CA had departed 
from the requirements of the Sentencing Act when setting a sliding scale of percentage 
discounts for a plea of guilty, depending on timing. For an earliest possible plea, the CA 
guideline indicated a 33 percent discount, but the SC disagreed, instead settling for a 
maximum 25 percent reduction given that the mitigating factors of remorse and assistance to 
the authorities should properly be dealt with independently. This variable is applicable to 
period 3 only.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 The Estimation Framework
To examine the effect of various sentencing criteria and other case characteristics on 
HSE sentencing variability, we estimate OLS versions of a single-equation ‘baseline’ linear 
model where total financial liability and its two components are separately regressed on a 
vector of specific sentencing factors from the Guidelines as interpreted by District Court 
judges, year binary variables, the Consumer Price Index and the number of physically-
harmed victims, and include a normally distributed error term. In a second model, called the 
‘full’ model, we add several other ‘facts of the particular cases’ (viz., the presence of a 
voluntary payment, employer attendance at a restorative justice conference, employee breach
11
of duty, employer size, the number of related defendants and, for case-level analysis, the 
number of charges laid).20
Estimated OLS coefficients for s 6 sentences are reported in Tables 2-4 while those 
for case level sentences are reported in Tables 5-7. Tables 2-7 along with Table 8 are 
displayed at the end of this article. The notation ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance 
at the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, respectively, while standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. Previous work suggested that Tobit 
regressions added little additional information. Hence, OLS estimates (which are easier to 
interpret) are reported below. We focus our discussion on the composition of total financial 
liability between fines and reparations and produce results for total liability for completeness 
and comparison with our earlier work.
4.2 Results for Section 6 Offences
4.2.1 Fines
[ TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE ]
Inspection of Table 2 shows that in period 2, ‘high’ culpability (compared to 
‘medium’) attracted a (highly significant) premium of $24,671 in the baseline model 
($27,428 in the full model) while ‘low-medium’ culpability yielded a (significant) discount of 
$4,657 in the baseline model only. Other levels of culpability were not significant in 
explaining variations in the level of fines imposed for either model. In period 3, however, 
with sentences now subject to the Hanham & Philp Guidelines, all levels of culpability are 
significant, typically at relatively high levels, and the signs of the coefficients are as we 
would expect with discounts for ‘low’ and ‘low-medium’ culpability and premiums for 
‘medium-high’ and high culpability. For the baseline model, compared to period 2, the 
premium for high culpability falls by 37.5 percent to $15,419. The (significant) premium for 
medium-high culpability, however, is $8,864 which is similar in magnitude to the (highly 
significant) discount of $8,620 for low-medium culpability. Further, low culpability now 
attracts a (highly significant) large discount of $22,301. For the full model, results are similar. 
The (significant) premium for high culpability falls by 31.6 percent to $18,750. The 
(significant) premium for medium-high culpability is $9,987 and the (highly significant) 
discount for low-medium culpability is $7,454. Low culpability now attracts a (highly 
significant) discount of $21,963. The period 3 results for fines imposed are robust to both 
model specifications and clearly accord with the primacy given to culpability in Hanham & 
Philp in assessing starting points for fines within specific guideline ranges even when all 
other determinants of fines imposed are accounted for. 
A ‘fatal’ degree of harm (compared to ‘high’) is highly significant both in the baseline 
and full models in period 2, the respective coefficients being $17,683 and $9,187. In contrast, 
  
20 Variables used in the previous work to capture interactive effects of the explanatory variables, an industry 
relevant accident rate using ACC data, and dummy variables for District Courts and their judges have been 
removed from the specification as they provided almost no explanatory power and our degrees of freedom are 
limited for period 3.
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fatal harm is not a significant determinant of fines in either model in period 3. This is not 
entirely surprising given the shift to setting starting points for fines on the basis of levels of 
culpability.21  The “realised risk” of harm, however, was included in the Hanham & Philp 
judgment (at [54)]) among seven suggested determinants of culpability. In determining the 
starting point for the revised fine in Hanham & Philp Contractors, both the actual harm and 
potential for greater harm was argued [(at 156]) as one of three reasons influencing the 
assessment of culpability at towards the lower end of the high band. Actual harm also appears 
in the discussions of culpability in the other two cases in Hanham & Philp. It was, however,
acknowledged [(at [52]), that “both the HSE Act and the Sentencing Act oblige the court to 
have regard to the degree of harm that has occurred.” Further, the Hanham & Philp judgment, 
when assessing relevant aggravating factors under s 9 Sentencing Act, did not include “the 
extent of any loss, damage, or harm resulting from the offence” as required under s 9(d) of 
the Act. Thus, actual harm as a separate sentencing factor instead appears to have been 
subsumed in the assessment of culpability.
A defendant’s financial limitations attracted a sentencing discount in both models for 
both periods, the estimated coefficients for this variable all being highly significant. The 
discounts amount to $8,555 for the baseline model and $9,312 for the full model in period 2. 
These discounts (which depend on the Courts’ assessment of financial capacity) are greater in 
magnitude by 57.9 percent for the baseline model and 27.3 percent for the full model in 
period 3.
In period 2, discounts amounting to approximately $12,000 apply in the presence of 
an early plea of guilty for both models, although the estimated coefficient is only weakly 
significant in the case of the baseline model. In period 3, ‘Guilty plea’ and ‘Guilty plea 
discount’ must be seen together. A guilty plea discount equals 1 if there is both a guilty plea 
at the outset and the time period is post the Supreme Court decision in Hessell.  Neither of 
these variables appear to make any systematic difference in the setting of fines in period 3, an 
unexpected result. Two points, however, should be noted. First, the early HSE decisions 
following Hessell CA tended to adopt the 33 percent maximum discount for an early guilty 
plea, which mistakenly included an allowance for remorse. The Hessell SC decision 
unbundled discounts for a guilty plea and for remorse, with a maximum discount of 25 
percent for an early plea. Secondly, and of likely importance, the Hessell plea discounts are
applied as percentages of sentencing endpoints, i.e., after adjustments are made for any 
aggravating and mitigating factors. Further, the bundling of mitigating factors when 
calculating endpoints has come under challenge, in particular following the appeal decision in 
Ballard v Department of Labour, (2010) 7 NZELR 301 where percentage reductions in the 
fine (from the starting point) for each of a range of mitigating factors listed in Hanham & 
Philp were made. Percentage discounting implies that the absolute values of plea discounts 
can differ markedly across cases depending on starting points chosen for fines as well as the 
treatment of aggravating and mitigating factors.
The Courts also appear to take only modest systematic notice of a defendant’s safety 
record in period 3 with no discount of the fine for positive aspects of an employer’s safety 
  
21 The emphasis given to culpability in Hanham & Philp seems consistent with the amendment to the HSE Act 
making for uniform maximum fines independently of whether harm was suffered or not.
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record but impose a (weakly significant) penalty of $6,637 in the baseline model and a 
(significant) penalty of $8,253 in the full model for a record exhibiting previous convictions.
This contrasts sharply with period 2, where, although a positive record appears to do little to 
assist employers, both models yield a premium of at least $10,000 for a record containing 
previous convictions, and a very large premium well in excess of $60,000 for a poor record, 
the relevant estimated coefficients all being highly significant. Interestingly, in some recent 
cases, the presence of previous convictions is considered to be consistent with a good safety
record if the convictions are distant in time or the employer has a large workforce, the 
rationale being that the probability of serious-harm accidents is greater than for smaller 
employers in spite of the strict liability nature of HSE provisions.22
The remaining mitigating factors do not seem to go far in explaining the variability of 
fines in either period. The coefficients of remorse are negative for both models in period 3 
but are not significantly different from zero, and are only weakly significant for the baseline 
model in period 2 (but with a “wrong” positive sign).23 There is no evidence that 
‘Cooperation with the authorities’ offers a significant discount in either period. An 
employer’s remedial action and the need for either specific or general deterrence also appear 
to have little systematic effect on the level of fines in either period, for either model. For 
other ‘facts specific to the individual case,’ there is some weak evidence that an increase in 
the number of physically harmed victims raises a fine, but the evidence is not uniform across 
either models or periods. In period 3, both models surprisingly predict that a discount is 
offered. And although the coefficient of the presence of voluntary payments by employers is 
highly significant for the full model in period 2, its positive sign is unexpected, as is also the 
case in period 3.
Overall, the baseline (full) model explains 51 percent (57 percent) of the variation in 
period 2 fines and 56 percent (58 percent) of the variation in period 3 fines. 
4.2.2 Reparations
Unlike setting fines for HSE offences, no guidelines exist for fixing the quantum of 
reparation awards to victims.24 In these circumstances, we considered it interesting to 
examine the extent to which the variables that we used to explain variations in the level of 
fines were also capable of explaining variations in reparation orders. Prior to examining the 
composition of HSE sentences, our view was that it would be surprising if many variables 
other than the level of harm transpired to be statistically significant determinants of 
variability in reparation awards. The more likely candidates for inclusion seemed to be the 
number of (physically harmed) victims and the number of related defendants. It might have 
  
22 Examples include Department of Labour v Transfield Services (New Zealand) Limited, CRI- 2010-03203227, 
Lower Hutt DC, 16 December 2010, where no uplift was applied to a large employer with two previous 
convictions, and Department of Labour v Graham Harris (2000) Limited, CRI-2011-043-003018, New 
Plymouth DC, 25 November 2011, where a 5 percent discount was given for a good safety record in spite of a 
previous conviction.
23 Menclova and Woodfield (2011) also find positive signs for the coefficients of the remorse variable and make 
some attempt to explain this result by interacting remorse with harm and culpability variables. 
24 The sentencing criteria outlined by Harrison J.  in Police v Ferrier, CRI 2003-404-000195, Auckland HC, 18 
November 2003 in respect of reparations do not provide guidance as to how the amount of reparation should be 
set.
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been thought, however, that the magnitudes of any positive significant coefficients would be 
larger (or, at least no smaller) for period 3, given that there had been a substantial increase in 
the High Court award of reparation to the family of the deceased victim in Black Reef Mine 
and that the award to the victim in Cookie Time was described as being barely adequate. 
Against this, however, the decision to substantially raise the reparation award in Black Reef 
Mine followed from the determination that the financial capacity of the company was 
considered to be greater than that assessed by the trial judge and that no adjustment of 
reparation was made in the other two cases for which the financial capacity of the respective 
companies was not an issue.
[ TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE ]
Estimation results for reparations are reported in Table 3. Our a priori expectations of 
the role of the level of harm in determining reparation awards were clearly realised both for 
period 2 and period 3 for both models. The coefficients for low-medium harm (relative to 
high) are all negative and are generally highly significant for both models. Discounts for low-
medium harm are considerably greater in period 3 than in period 2, more than double for 
baseline estimates and more than 230 percent for the full model estimates. For fatal harm, the 
estimated coefficients are all positive, relatively large and highly significant for both models 
in both periods. They are, however, of very similar magnitudes for each model in each 
period, viz., $27,995 (period 2) and $27,228 (period 3) for the baseline model, and $30,557 
(period 2) and $30,130 (period 3) for the full model. The coefficients are uniformly 
somewhat smaller for period 3. These results seem consistent with the view of their Honours 
in Hanham & Philp (at [4]) that the three appeals “are concerned solely with fines imposed 
under s 50 HSE Act.” There appears to be no evidence that DC judges at large interpreted the 
increased reparation award in Black Reef Mine as signalling a need to increase such awards 
generally.25
Regarding the number of victims, our estimates for period 2 produce surprising 
results, viz., both models predict a significant discount of approximately $2,500 for each 
additional accident victim. The results for period 3, however, are much more intuitively 
appealing, with the models predicting significant and substantial sentencing premiums in the 
range of $14,484 - $18,933 for each additional victim. As for the number of related 
defendants, although the full model indicates that some discounting of reparations is 
suggested, the estimated coefficient is only weakly significant for period 2.26  
The level of culpability appears to explain little of the variation in the reparation 
awards paid to victims in period 3 although there is some weak evidence in the baseline
model that high culpability attracts a sentencing premium. This contrasts with the results for 
period 2, where both low-medium and medium-high levels of culpability are (at least weakly) 
significant determinants of reparations in both models, the relevant coefficients being in 
excess of $12,600 and of similar magnitude. The result for period 3 seems less surprising 
than for period 2 since it is not evident that compensating for the level of emotional harm (the 
dominating element of most awards) has anything much to do with employer culpability.
  
25 Period 3 cases, however, may be less representative than those for period 2 in part because of the smaller 
sample size for the former.
26 The number of cases involving multiple related defendants, however, is relatively small in both periods.
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From the s 6 results, it appears that an impact of Hanham & Philp may have been to shift a 
systematic use of some levels of culpability away from reparations and on to fines.
Remedial action is not significant in period 2 but is so in period 3 for both models, 
being highly significant for the baseline model. The coefficients are positive and substantial, 
being greater than $18,800 in each case. Such action is cold comfort for accident victims and 
their dependants, and recent judgments may reflect a view that easily avoidable accidents 
should have been avoided and that victims should be compensated accordingly.27 Remorse is 
weakly significant in period 2 for both models, although its sign is positive. The sign 
switches for period 3 estimates for both models, but the coefficient estimates are not 
significant. A poor safety record generates a (weakly significant) reparations premium in 
period 2 only, and then only in the baseline model. 
The positive and significant coefficient for a guilty plea must be taken in conjunction 
with the guilty plea discount dummy that applies after Hessell for period 3.  The guilty plea 
discount coefficient is significant in both the baseline and full models and the sign is 
negative.  The combined effect is that courts appear to recognise the presence of an early plea 
with a discount in reparations.  Interestingly, we do not find evidence of this discount for 
fines where it would be expected.  
The existence of voluntary payments made continues to attract a (significant) discount
which is nearly three times as large for period 3 than period 2.
Employer presence at a restorative justice conference is highly significant in period 3 
and attracts a large sentencing premium. These conferences, however, are rare and we have 
little confidence in these particular estimates. The result is difficult to explain but could be 
similar to remedial action in acting as an indicator of the degree of culpability. There is no 
evidence of any systematic effect of attendance at such conferences for period 2.
The presence of reparation insurance has a (weakly significant) substantial positive 
effect on reparation awards but only in period 3. Interestingly, the coefficient on the Street 
Smart dummy is positive, substantial, significant for both models in period 2. This implies 
that reparation awards were systematically higher in response to the appeal court’s ruling that 
put paid to the common practice of more or less automatic dollar-for-dollar discounting of 
fines for reparations and argues that the presence of reparation insurance must also affect the 
size of the fine. We find no evidence, however, that courts systematically raised fines in 
response to the Street Smart decision. At the time of this decision, however, it appears to 
have been common knowledge that Hanham & Philp was awaiting consideration by a Full 
Bench of the High Court, in which case these, and other issues, would be further addressed. 
In the meantime, DC judges seemed reluctant to move on the matter of raising fines.
Finally, an increase in the consumer price index has a (significant) negative impact on 
reparation awards in period 3 but has no systematic effect in period 2. The logic of this result 
is mystifying.
  
27 Interestingly, in two recent cases, Judge Farish refused to give a discount for remedial action when assessing 
the fine on the grounds that the measures should have already been taken. See Department of Labour v 
Goodman Fielder New Zealand Limited, CRN 10009503489, Christchurch DC, 10 August 2011, and 
Department of Labour v Tegel Foods Limited, CRN 110095000749, Rangiora DC, 27 September 2011.
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Given the paucity of guidelines for setting amounts of reparation, it is interesting that 
a number of factors other than harm appear to significantly influence reparation awards. It 
must be noted, however, that the sentencing guideline factors augmented by subsequent 
appeal rulings as adopted in this article were hardly designed as a set of determinants of 
reparation awards. As a consequence, for assessing compensation for emotional harm, it is 
common for judges to quote Hammond J in Sargent v Police (1997) 15 CRNZ 454, 458, 
whereby “The quantification of loss of this kind is inherently intractable,” or make similar 
caveats themselves. It is also common, however, for counsel to recommend reparation awards 
on the basis of those awarded in similar cases, for which guidance judges occasionally 
express their gratitude before typically taking some middle ground between prosecution and 
defence submissions on the matter. 
Overall, the baseline (full) model explains 52 percent (55 percent) of the variation in 
period 2 reparation awards and 61 percent (72 percent) of the variation in period 3 awards.
4.2.3 Total Financial Liability 
[ TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE ]
Total financial liability is defined as the sum of fines and reparation awards and, apart 
from occasional minor awards of court-related costs, represents the financial cost to an 
employer of a successfully prosecuted workplace accident. Estimation results are reported in 
Table 4. What is important in determining the levels of fines and reparation awards to victims 
is also likely to be important here. Hence, we find significant sentencing discounts for low-
medium culpability and financial limitations, and premiums for high levels of culpability for 
both models in both periods. We also find significant discounts for low culpability, low-
medium harm, being a medium-sized employer, and for qualifying for a guilty plea discount 
for both models in period 3, as well as significant premiums in respect of the number of 
victims and carrying reparation insurance in this period. Significant premiums for the 
presence of remedial action and attendance at a restorative justice conference are counter-
intuitive. Compared to period 2, the defendant’s safety record does not appear to contribute 
much to the explanation of the variation in sentencing. Similar to the component estimates, a 
number of variables have significant coefficients but their effects are patchy and their signs 
are sometimes counter-intuitive.
Overall, the baseline (full) model explains 63 percent (65 percent) of the variation in 
period 2 total financial liability and 66 percent (74 percent) of the variation in period 3 total 
liability. In both periods our models do better in explaining the variation in total liability than 
in either of their respective components. 
4.3 Case-Level Results
In what follows, we emphasize broad similarities and differences with s 6 results 
reported in section 4.2 above. Readers are referred to Tables 5-7 for detailed estimates.
4.3.1 Fines
[ TABLE 5 APPROXIMATELY HERE ]
17
Results for case-level fines are reported in Table 5. The general nature of the s 6 
results for the impacts of culpability and harm on fines are similar at the case level. High 
culpability and fatal harm are highly significant determinants of the variation in fines for both 
models in period 2, the relevant coefficients being suggestive of substantial sentencing 
premiums. Low-medium harm generates discounts in fines in period 2. For period 3, 
however, all levels of culpability are highly significant in all but one instance and the 
coefficient signs are as expected. In this period, fatal harm is no longer a significant 
determinant of fines. Low-medium harm, however, offers a significant and quite substantial 
discount for both models. The case-level results provide a useful robustness test in that the 
strong result in respect of the switch away from a very important direct role for fatal harm as 
a determinant of fines in the pre Hanham & Philp period carry over from the s 6 results. An 
important difference, however, is that while low-medium harm exhibits no significant 
influence on fines in period 2, a significant discount emerges in both models for period 3. 
Thus, to the extent that harm diirectly influences sentences of fines post Hanham & Philp, the 
effect is to reduce the level of fines.
 
As with s 6 results, a defendant’s financial limitations attracted a sentencing discount 
in both models for both periods, the estimated coefficients for this variable all being highly 
significant. Again, these discounts are considerably larger for period 3 than for period 2. A 
substantial significant discount for an early guilty plea emerges for both models at the case 
level, but only for period 2. The s 6 result of significant positive coefficients for a guilty plea 
in period 3 does not carry over to case-level analysis. Section 6 results in respect of a sub-par 
safety record carry over but for fewer aspects of inadequacy and at lower levels of 
significance. Possessing a ‘great’ safety record produces a discount for both periods for the 
full model. A significant premium in respect of the number of victims emerges for both 
models for period 2. For period 3, however, the odd result of (at least weakly) significant 
discounts in the s 6 results is not reproduced at the case level. The odd s 6 results suggesting a 
premium for voluntary payments in the full model, however, do carry over. There is some 
weak evidence of a discount for being a small employer in the case-level estimates for period 
2.
Overall, the baseline (full) model explains 48 percent (55 percent) of the variation in 
period 2 fines and 52 percent (55 percent) of the variation in period 3 fines at the case level. 
4.3.2 Reparations
[ TABLE 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE ]
Results for reparations are reported in Table 6. As with s 6 results, our expectations of 
the role of the level of harm in determining reparation awards were again clearly realised for 
both models. The coefficients for low-medium harm (relative to high) are all negative and 
significant. Discounts for low-medium harm are again considerably greater in period 3 than 
in period 2. For fatal harm, the estimated coefficients are again all positive, relatively large 
and highly significant for both models in both periods. They are, however, of much less 
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similar magnitudes for each model, viz., $27,296 (period 2) and $21,007 (period 3) for the 
baseline model, and $30,589 (period 2) and $21,619 (period 3) for the full model. The 
coefficients are uniformly substantially smaller for period 3. These results strengthen our s 6 
conclusion that there is little by way of evidence in support of a general increase in 
reparations embodied in the appeal decision in Black Reef Mine. 
Regarding the number of victims, our estimates produce more appealing intuitive 
results than for s 6 alone. In contrast to s6 results (where both models predict a significant 
discount for each additional accident victim in period 2), both models predict a very small 
discount that is totally without significance for this period. The results for period 3, however, 
affirm the s 6 results with the models predicting highly significant and substantial sentencing 
premiums (of $18,739 in the baseline model and $16,615 in the full model). As for the 
number of related defendants, the full model continues to indicate some discounting of 
reparations, but the estimated coefficient is only significant for period 3 (whereas it is weakly 
significant for period 2 in the s 6 results). 
The level of culpability continues to explain a modest amount of the variation in the 
reparations awarded to victims in period 3 although both models suggest a significant and 
substantial premium of approximately $30,000 for high culpability, possibly because 
assessments of high culpability are more likely to arise where realised harm is very serious.
In contrast, for period 2, both models predict a (weakly significant) discount of 
approximately $8,000 for low culpability and highly significant premiums in excess of 
$14,000 for medium-high culpability. The expected role of culpability in determining 
reparations is unclear to us, although it seems less likely in period 2 given that culpability and 
harm are separate sentencing factors in this period.
The various aspects of a defendant’s safety record follow the s 6 results and have 
limited explanatory power although there is now also a (weakly significant) reparations 
discount for a great record in period 2, but only in the baseline model. We continue to find a 
(net) discount for an early guilty plea in both models for period 3, along with a voluntary 
payments discount that is substantially greater in period 3. The presence of reparation 
insurance continues to have a (weakly) significant if substantial positive effect on reparation 
awards in period 3, and the coefficient on the Street Smart dummy is positive, substantial, 
and significant for both models in (the relevant) period 2. Thus, both the s 6 and case-level 
results support the view that the decision in Street Smart (as affirmed in Hanham & Philp) 
induced DC judges to substantially increase their reparation awards when dollar-for-dollar 
discounting of fines for reparation awards was no longer to be  regular practice. Counter-
intuitive results for remedial action, remorse, and attendance at a restorative justice 
conference also carry over from the s 6 results.
Overall, the baseline (full) model explains 40 percent (42 percent) of the variation in 
period 2 reparation awards and 60 percent (68 percent) of the variation in period 3 awards at 
case level.
4.3.3 Total Financial Liability
[ TABLE 7 APPROXIMATELY HERE ]
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Estimation results are reported in Table 7. The case-level results are a little different 
from their s 6 counterparts, although not in a fundamental way. We find significant 
sentencing discounts for low culpability, low-medium harm and financial limitations, and 
premiums for high levels of culpability for both models in both periods. Both premiums and 
discounts are of substantially greater magnitudes in period 3 in all cases. We also find 
significant discounts in period 2 for being a small employer, for a guilty plea (for both 
models), and for a great safety record (for both models). Highly significant and substantial 
premiums for the number of victims are found for both models in period 3. Highly significant 
premiums for the presence of remedial action and a significant premium for attendance at a
restorative justice conference in period 3 continue to be counter-intuitive. Although aspects 
of a defendant’s safety record do not appear to contribute much to the explanation of the 
variation in sentencing in period 2, the effects are even more limited in period 3. Similar to 
the component estimates, a number of other variables have significant coefficients but their 
effects are patchy and their signs are sometimes counter-intuitive. 
Overall, the baseline (full) model explains 53 percent (55 percent) of the variation in 
period 2 total financial liability and 63 percent (70 percent) of the variation in period 3 total 
liability. In both periods our models do better in explaining the variation in total liability than 
in either of their respective components. 
4.4 Summary of Estimation Results 
Table 8 provides a summary of results for coefficient estimates that we consider to be 
reasonably robust in that they are at least weakly significant for estimates in both the baseline 
and full models. The estimated coefficients (in thousands of dollars) refer to the full model 
and have been broadly rounded. Their significance levels are indicated in each instance. We 
cannot be too confident about the robustness of these results, however, since while some 
coefficients are significant, their signs are unexpected. Examples include the presence of 
remorse, remedial action, attendance at a restorative justice conference and the impact of CPI 
changes.
[ TABLE 8 APPROXIMATELY HERE ]
Inspection of Table 8 shows a number of important empirical results discussed in 
detail in the previous section. First and foremost, the switch in the importance of the 
culpability variables from a low level (except for high culpability) in the explanation of 
period 2 fines to a high level of importance in explaining fines following the introduction of 
the Hanham & Philp Guidelines in period 3 is evident. That all culpability levels become 
significant determinants of fines in period 3 confirms the strong influence of the Guidelines 
on sentencing policy adopted by DC judges. In addition, we felt confident to assign DC 
judges’ assessments of employer culpability to five categories rather than the three broad 
categories specified by the Guidelines. In Hanham & Philp (at [53]), DoL’s proposal of 18 
categories of culpability was rejected on the grounds of “its complexity and level of 
refinement that would make it difficult to apply in practice.” District Court judges bound by 
the Guidelines, however, appear to have adopted some level of refinement when setting 
starting points. Second, although the culpability variables have some role in explaining the 
variation in reparation awards in period 2, they have only a very limited impact in period 3. 
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The culpability variables, however, are quite important in explaining the variation in total 
liability in both periods, largely resulting from the dominating impact of either fines or 
reparations in each period.
The fatal harm variable is a highly important determinant of fines in period 2 but is 
not significant at all in period 3, while low-medium harm is only significant in period 3. In 
comparison, fatal harm is a highly important determinant of reparations in both periods and 
low-medium harm is also an important determinant in both periods. For total liability, both 
fatal harm and to a lesser extent low-medium harm are important in explaining variations in 
total liability in both periods. The combination of substantial discounts for fines of lower 
levels of culpability and the removal of a direct role for harm in determining fines is likely to 
explain much of why period 3 mean fines, while substantially increased over those for period 
2, continue to remain dramatically below their statutory caps. This outcome may be an 
unintended by-product of the decision in Hanham & Philp to subsume realised harm in the 
assessment of culpability.
 
For the remaining De Spa variables, the evidence is quite patchy. A weak safety 
record of some form or other yields premiums for fines that sometimes carry over into total 
liability, but have no systematic effect on reparations. There is little evidence that an above 
average record offers much by way of sentencing discounts. The signs on the guilty plea 
coefficients are sometimes wrong, but when combined with the guilty plea discount dummy 
in period 3 make intuitive sense. The positive coefficients for remedial action for reparations 
and total liability in period 3 possibly suggest that many judges compensate accident victims 
more highly when employers shut their stable doors after their horses have bolted 
notwithstanding frequent judicial statements to the contrary. Occasional positive coefficients 
for remorse are puzzling, although some explanation is offered in our earlier work by 
interacting remorse with culpability and harm variables.
The remaining De Spa variables do poorly as prospective determinants of sentencing 
variability in either period. These include co-operation and the need for deterrence, either 
specific or general. Judges often state that a discount is offered for co-operation, but this is 
often bundled with other mitigating factors and the individual contribution of such factors 
may get lost in the process. Regarding deterrence, there are two issues that may help to 
explain its poor performance.  First, when coding deterrence, we have relied on statements 
specifically made in judicial decisions and sentencing notes. It may be that some judges give 
consideration to deterrence variables (and others for that matter) without making direct 
reference to them in their judgments. This may be particularly relevant for period 3, given 
that in Hanham & Philp (at [47]) their Honours included both elements of deterrence (inter 
alia) as statutory purposes that would generally justify imposing fines in addition to making 
reparation awards. Also, in the absence of decisions or sentencing notes, we have made 
widespread use of DoL’s Returns on Prosecutions which do not distinguish between specific 
and general deterrence when indicating whether DC judges made specific reference to 
deterrence in their judgments. Consequently, where “deterrence” is positively signalled in the 
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return, we have interpreted this as applying to both aspects of deterrence and our coding may 
be in error on occasions as a result.
Regarding variables representing ‘other facts of the case’, the number of charges has 
little systematic impact on sentencing at the case level. The number of physically harmed 
accident victims, however, makes much more of a contribution although the occasional 
negative signs appear ‘wrong’ but most coefficients are positive as expected. Making a 
voluntary payment yields discounts for reparations generally, but these are countered by 
offsetting increases to the level of fines. Attendance at a restorative justice conference 
strangely yields a large premium in reparation in period 3, but the observations on this 
variable are highly limited. There is little evidence that a breach of employee duty 
systematically affects sentencing, although a discount for reparations is offered at the case 
level in period 2. Being a small employer provides a small discount for both fines and 
reparations in period 2, but not otherwise. Carrying reparation insurance produces a hefty 
increase in the sentence of reparations in period 3 and also for the few cases for which the 
post Street Smart case dummy applies in period 2. The ACC top-up dummy clearly has little 
explanatory power, but the guilty plea discounts offer substantial discounts for period 3 
reparations. When combined with the positive guilty plea coefficients, the evidence suggests 
that judges do reduce the severity of sentences for those employers subject to the guilty plea 
discount, i.e., those convicted and sentenced after 2 October, 2009. A guilty plea usually 
results in compensation being paid at an earlier date, an outcome applauded by many DC 
judges. The coefficients on the number of related defendants are uniformly negative 
indicating that sentence sharing for reparations occurs when there are multiple defendants. 
5 Estimation Design Issues
The model estimates produced in this article are based on a reasonably comprehensive 
specification of the sentencing process. Considerable sentencing variation, however, remains 
unexplained by our analysis. There are a number of reasons for this which could be addressed 
in a quest to provide more accurate statistical results than we have achieved.
One design issue that is a subject of our current research is a change in the 
specification of the model, replacing the values of certain variables by their natural 
logarithms. A major reason to investigate this issue arises from a common (if not uniform) 
sentencing procedure, viz., to set values of many mitigating factors (say) as percentages of 
starting points for fines rather than as values that are independent of starting points. For 
example, ignoring other sentencing factors, there is a considerable difference between 
awarding a 10 percent discount for a given mitigating factor when the starting point is 
$150,000 than where it is $50,000. The discount is $15,000 in the first example and $5,000 in 
the second. Compare to an example where a judge instead awards $10,000 for the mitigating 
factor in either case. It appears to be becoming much more common to allow percentage 
rather than absolute discounts, and the absolute discounts stated may simply reflect a 
percentage amount contemplated by the judges in any case. 
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A second design issue of importance lies in the hands of the courts, viz., the frequent 
absence of information on the proportion of an endpoint fine that would be imposed were the 
defendant financially capable of paying it but which cannot be met by a given defendant due 
to financial limitations. Where a claim of financial limitations is made and accepted by the 
court it would be very helpful to know the judge’s assessment of the seriousness of these 
limitations. An example is that of the Black Reef Mine appeal case. There, the HC judges 
revealed that the defendant would have faced a fine of $70,000 had they been financially 
capable of paying this amount. They were not capable of doing so, and the actual fine of 
$20,000 (revised upwards from the DC fine of $10,000 when it became evident that a larger 
fine was payable) is only 29 percent of the endpoint fine, indicating substantial financial 
limitations in spite of the raised fine. In the interests of systematic and transparent sentencing 
procedures, it would not seem a difficult matter for courts to routinely report this index of 
incapacity for relevant cases. The problem is exacerbated in that where researchers do not 
have convenient access to all judicial decisions and sentencing notes, resort is made to what 
is available. In DoL’s Returns on Prosecutions, an offender is indicated as either having 
financial limitations or not. For these reasons, and because decisions and sentencing notes do 
not always record relevant information on endpoint fines, we have been forced to code 
financial limitations by a binary variable.
We would strongly recommend that Returns on Prosecutions indicate endpoint fines 
in cases involving financial limitations, and that the courts make these available at trial so 
that they may be recorded.28 A major benefit should be the reduction in the number of 
seriously under-predicted fines where, typically, serious financial limitations are paramount. 
It would also be desirable if legal counsel for the informant completing Returns on 
Prosecutions routinely listed starting points for fines and specific increases/reductions for 
aggravating/mitigating factors along with the stage of proceedings at which any plea of guilty 
is made, including any specific or percentage discount allowed for such plea.
 
We are surprised by the general unimportance seemingly given to deterrence factors 
by District Courts in respect of our statistical explanations of variations in fines. Where 
Returns on Prosecutions are our only source of coding information, it is unfortunate that these 
returns do not distinguish between general and specific deterrence in their Sentencing 
Criteria. We recommend that future Returns on Prosecutions include this important 
information.  Further, judges subject to relevant guideline cases and statutes may implicitly 
be accounting for deterrence factors in their sentencing. If so, we strongly recommend that 
they make such accounting transparent and reported in court, and that the informant’s counsel 
record any such information in their returns. Further revisions of maximum fines for HSE 
sentencing are not usefully guided if there is little confidence that courts take notice of either 
or both deterrence factors when sentencing or that courts may or may not take systematic 
account of these factors but are not recorded as doing so in many circumstances.
  
28 Returns on Prosecutions typically record starting points for fines although a completely consistent treatment 
of this (and other) issues would be helpful.
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We would also argue for a finer gradation of harm than we recorded in our database. 
We felt uncomfortable about assigning other than three broad bands including fatal, high, and 
low-moderate harm for the judicial assessment of harm when coding data. The ‘high’ harm 
level seems to be excessively represented; for example, of the 2,438 charges listed in our 
master database, nearly eighty percent are coded as involving a high level of harm. We 
believe it would be very helpful if judges would routinely report their assessment of harm 
levels within five bands, viz., fatal, very high, serious, moderate, and low harm.
We disagree with the decision in Hanham & Philp to reject a finer gradation of 
culpability assessment than the three broad bands adopted. The reasons given for rejecting 
DoL’s proposal of 18 bands are less than compelling. An examination of post Hanham & 
Philp DC decisions reveals that this judiciary generally appears quite comfortable with 
describing culpability levels more precisely than just low, medium, or high. This is to be 
expected, since each level of assessed culpability must be assigned a specific dollar amount 
as the chosen starting point. By way of example, Moore J. in Department of Labour v  APN 
Print NZ Limited, CRN 10070503485, DC Tauranga, 16 January 2012 was reported in the 
Return on Prosecution for the case as assessing culpability “slightly below the mid-point of 
the medium range.” While we have rejected inferring culpability from the starting point 
chosen, it is arguable that it could be done in that if a starting point chosen implies an 
assessment of culpability outside the band reported by a judge, the chosen fine might be 
either manifestly excessive or inadequate if the case came to appeal. If other sentencing 
factors also served to directly determine starting points, however, this process becomes more 
complicated to evaluate unless these factors operate solely through their impact on the 
assessment of culpability. In present circumstances we recommend that a 10 point scale for 
culpability should be adopted, each point being associated with a corresponding narrower 
range of starting points than adopted in Hanham & Philp. Point 10 could represent extremely 
high culpability (as proposed by the informant in Mobile Refrigeration, but rejected by Judge 
Spear on the grounds that the offender’s actions did not constitute a “callous disregard for 
safety”). The remaining points could provide uniform bands from the bottom of band 10 to a 
specified minimum, possibly zero. 
Finally, there are surely lessons to be learned from the analysis of sentencing policy in 
periods 2 and 3 for legislative drafting itself. It is granted that the transaction costs of 
specifying every set of circumstances are prohibitive and that it is the responsibility of the 
courts to interpret legislation in specific circumstances. Under Sentencing Act s 40(4A)(a) 
courts must take into account the amount of reparation payable when setting a fine. For HSE 
sentencing, we fully agree with their Honours in Hanham & Philp (at [47]) that given 
absence of financial limitations, “the imposition of a fine in addition to reparation will 
generally be required to address the separate statutory purposes of denunciation, deterrence 
(both general and specific) and holding the offender accountable for the harm done.” It would 
seem difficult to believe that these purposes could ever be fully achieved under the dollar-for-
dollar discounting process adopted by the courts during period 2. For the early part of this 
period, the levels of total financial liability seemed little different from “business as usual” in 
spite of the changes enacted by HSE Amendment Act 2002, while, for the latter part of period 
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2, “business” still hardly approached what we consider the legislators had in mind when the 
HSE Act was amended. What seems difficult for us to understand is why such a situation 
lasted as long as it did, and whether the legislation needed to be quite so delightfully vague in 
the first place.
6 Concluding Remarks
Using fairly comprehensive empirical models of sentencing factors, this article has 
attempted to explain the determinants of HSE sentencing in NZ in the period following the 
joint implementation of the Sentencing Act 2002 and the HSE Amendment Act 2002 through 
to the introduction of the Hanham & Philp Guidelines in December 2008, and in the 
following period through to March 2012. Overall, there is quite strong evidence in support of 
the continued use of HSE sentencing guidelines to induce District Court judges to change 
their sentencing behaviour, particularly where the guidelines (and subsequent appeal cases) 
provide a more structured approach.
 Such a conclusion, however, should be tempered by the fact that there remains 
considerable unexplained variation in HSE sentencing. Our view is that if it is wished to take 
this type of analysis further, it may be necessary to further refine the specification of our 
model and for some modifications to be made to the available data.  The latter will require a 
slightly more systematic and transparent treatment of sentencing factors by the judiciary, 
along with a slightly more consistent and detailed reporting by counsel for the informant of 
many judicial decisions in Returns on Prosecutions. Easy access to a comprehensive 
electronic database of judicial decisions and sentencing notes would, of course, be superior 
and may allow the investigation of the determinants of assessments of culpability. While 
these changes are likely to improve the explanatory ability of our models, there will 
inevitably be some residual variation in sentencing given the broad categories of HSE 
offences. For those wishing to attempt to distinguish between “warranted” and “unwarranted” 
sentencing variation, the analysis of idiosyncratic features of individual cases appears 
inevitable. In Woodfield, Hickson and Menclova (2013), we have illustrated some features of 
a number of cases that appear to us to be obvious outliers in terms of their estimated forecast 
errors.
At the time of writing, the Government will shortly receive a report from the 
Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety the major terms of reference for 
which include the provision of an assessment of the current performance of the system of 
workplace health and safety, and to recommend a package of practical measures that have the 
objective of reducing fatalities and serious injuries by at least 25 percent by 2020. One issue 
that may loom large is whether or not the severity of HSE sentences should be increased in 
order to provide greater incentives for workplace health and safety precautions. Our present 
contribution provides no direct input into this debate. Nevertheless, a number of our results 
may be interesting in this context. First, it is clearly evident that the judiciary is willing to 
impose more severe sentences if provided with clearly structured criteria by higher courts.  It 
is also evident that mean HSE fines imposed still lie well below what many commentators 
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would regard as adequate for widespread sufficient deterrence. The major contribution of the 
level of harm in directly determining fines in earlier periods is no longer evident. This seems 
to particularly affect fines imposed on employers convicted in cases involving multiple 
victims suffering serious injuries. To the extent that harm currently affects fines, the channel 
mainly appears to be the Hanham & Philp requirement that DC judges adjust their 
assessments of culpability to reflect harm, yet harm is essentially an outcome of blameworthy 
conduct rather than a determinant of it. Judges also appear to have the capacity to treat harm 
as a separate sentencing factor, or to include it as an aggravating factor once starting points 
are determined, but may find themselves in difficulty with the Hanham & Philp Guidelines if 
they exercise these options. If fines are to be raised generally and if judges only embody 
harm in their culpability assessments, however, in our opinion either culpability assessments 
will have to be raised substantially or else maximum fines will have to be increased 
substantially.  
In addition, the magnitude of discounts for the many permissible mitigating factors 
makes endpoint fines very much smaller than typical starting points. There is a good 
argument for removing the discount for ‘prompt remedial action’ and imposing additional 
penalties if such action is less than prompt, although this requires monitoring from health and 
safety inspectors that are allegedly under-resourced. Further, since a major argument for 
offering ‘early guilty plea discounts’ involves a saving in court costs, perhaps these discounts 
could be more closely related to estimates of the savings rather than offering a percentage 
discount based on starting points for fines. A careful examination of other examples could 
prove fruitful.  
Finally, for offenders found to have financial limitations, the effect is to drive many 
fines to be a small proportion of their endpoints, let alone their starting points. For example, 
in period 2, we coded 26 percent of defendants as facing financial limitations, and this 
increases to 36 percent in period 3. Discounts for financial limitations are also much greater 
in the later period. We have suggested measures that might be considered to provide better 
levels of emotional harm reparation for victims and their dependants while leaving financially 
limited employers in a better position to pay fines.
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Tables 2 – 8
Table 2. Determinants of Fines; S6 Charges
Period 2 Period 3






















































































































































































































































R-squared 0.51 0.57 0.56 0.58
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Table 3. Determinants of Reparations; S6 Charges
Period 2 Period 3






















































































































































































































































R-squared 0.52 0.55 0.61 0.72
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Table 4. Determinants of Total Financial Liability; S6 Charges
Period 2 Period 3























































































































































































































































R-squared 0.63 0.65 0.66 0.74
29
Table 5. Determinants of Fines; Case-Level
Period 2 Period 3































































































































































































































































R-squared 0.48 0.55 0.52 0.55
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Table 6. Determinants of Reparations; Case-Level
Period 2 Period 3































































































































































































































































R-squared 0.40 0.42 0.60 0.68
31
Table 7. Determinants of Total Financial Liability; Case-Level
Period 2 Period 3
































































































































































































































































R-squared 0.53 0.55 0.63 0.70
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Table 8. Overview of Section 6 and Case-Level Estimation Results
Period 2 Period 3 Period 2 Period 3 Period 2 Period 3 Period 2 Period 3 Period 2 Period 3 Period 2 Period 3
S6 S6 Case Case S6 S6 Case Case S6 S6 Case Case
Low -22 -16 -8 -18 -11 -13 
Low-medium -7 -4 -5 -5 -9 -14 
Medium-High 10 12 13 14 14 14
High 27 19 23 22 30 32 37 21 51
Low/Medium -6 -5 -15 -4 -15 -17 -6 -20 
Fatal 9 6 31 30 31 22 40 37 37 23
Defendant's Financial Limitations -9 -12 -8 -12 -9 -15 -11 -18 
Remorse 5 5 10
Co-operation
Remedial Action 19 14 20 19
Guilty plea -12 -16 19 12 15 -17 
Need for particular deterrence
Need for general deterrence
Poor 62 35 70 41
Previous convictions 11 8 5 9
Good
Great -10 
Number of victims -2 4 -3 14 17 13 16
Number of charges 17
Voluntary payment made 10 5 12 4 -6 -16 -6 -10 -11 
Restorative justice conference 52 35 53 41
Employee breach of duty -4 9
Small -4 -5 -9 -17 
Medium -22 
Consumer Price Index -1 -1 -1 
Reparation Insurance 28 19 33
ACC Top up
Post Street Smart time period 17 14 20
Guilty plea discount -35 -24 -37 
Number of related defendants -8 -8 -12 -9 -11 
Constant 731 910 594
R-squared 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.72 0.42 0.68 0.65 0.74 0.55 0.7
For full model variables (underlined):
significant at 5% or 10% level in both models significant at 10% level
significant at 1% level in one model and 5% in the other significant at 5% level
significant at 1% level in both models significant at 1% level
Size of employer (compared to 
large)
Fines Reparations Total Liability
Degree of culpability (compared 
to medium)
Degree of harm (compared to 
high)
Safety record (compared to no 
previous convictions)
